

Jain-Buddhist Dialogue: Material from the Pāli Scriptures

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What exactly did the Buddhists know concerning the Jains? This has been an intriguing question which has given rise to various studies, the first of them being Jacobi's valuable observations in his introduction to the translation of two major Jain canonical works, the *Sūyagada* and the *Uttarajjhāyā* (1895). Miss Horner herself, in 1946, briefly considered the subject in her article "Gotama and the other sects",¹ some years after Leumann's book *Buddha und Mahāvīra* (1922), and before Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar's *Jainism in Buddhist Literature*, published in Nagpur in 1972.² Several other articles could also be mentioned and will be referred to in due course. In recent years, the relationship between the Buddha and the Jains has been at the center of a gentlemen's controversy between R. Gombrich and J. Bronkhorst.³

I am grateful to Peter Skilling for reading a draft of this paper and giving useful suggestions and additional references. — Abbreviations of the titles of Pāli texts are as in A *Critical Pāli Dictionary*. Other abbreviations are: BEI = *Bulletin d'Études Indiennes*; BHSD = F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*; BSOAS = *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*; CSCD: Chaṭṭha-Saṅgāyana CD-ROM; *Jaina Path* = P.S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Delhi, 1979); *Jaina Sūtras* = H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II (Oxford), 1895; JOIB = *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda*; WZKS = *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*.

¹ JAOS 66 (1946), pp. 283–89.

² There have been other less well-known attempts at comparisons such as Wolfgang Bohn, *Die Religion des Jina und ihr Verhältnis zum Buddhismus* (München, 1921), 36 pp. (extract from *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus*).

³ R. Gombrich, "The Buddha and the Jains", *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 48, 4 (1994), pp. 1069–96; J. Bronkhorst, "The Buddha and the Jainas reconsidered", *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 49, 2 (1995), pp. 333–50 (abridged version published under the same title in *Approaches to*

Therefore, it might not be out of place to review and assess the available data — which means that what I will write owes much to my predecessors — and provide another picture which can be compared with “Buddhists and Buddhism in the Earlier Literature of the Śvetāmbara Jains”.⁴

I will address issues pertaining to Jain practices, Jain doctrine, and ways of argumentation, after assessing the contexts wherein relevant information is embedded in Pāli scriptures. As far as possible, I will maintain an awareness of chronology and avoid conflating texts of different periods: what the commentaries by Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla, dating at least from the fifth century A.D., or the sub-commentaries report about the Jains may *a priori* be different from what the Pāli canon states. I shall thus deal with the Buddhists and the Jains rather than with the Buddha and Mahāvīra or the Buddha and the Jains.

Pāli literature does not use the term “Jain”. The generic designation for them as followers of the Jina or the Jinas (“the Conqueror(s)”) became common from at least the ninth century onwards.⁵ This is not surprising since the word *jina* is not used at this stage as a proper name but as a general title of rather wide scope. There is not much variety in the designations: in Pāli the word *khapanaka* (Pkt *khavaṇaya*, *khamaya*, *khamaga*; Jain Skt *kṣapanaka*) is represented by a single late occurrence in the Abhiddhānappadīpika-ṭīkā.⁶ Otherwise the usual

Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols, ed. N.K. Wagle and O. Qvarnström (University of Toronto), 1999, pp. 86–90.

⁴By W.B. Bollée, in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I.B. Horner*, ed. L.S. Cousins et al. (Dordrecht, 1974), pp. 27–39.

⁵See *Jaina Path*, p. 2, n. 3.

⁶Burmese edition p. 364 according to CSCD (*khapanaka-bhāsāya*). This word is also found in non-Pāli Buddhist literature (e.g. *kṣapanaka-siddhānta* in the Vimalaprabhā-ṭīkā of the Laghukālacakrataṇtra (Sarnath, 1986), p. 269), and *kṣapanā* in the Mahāvyutpatti (see BHSD s.v.) but seems less frequently used than *nirgrantha*, which appears as the standard term. The Jain term, which literally means “who rejects, throws away”, is to be connected with the idea conveyed by the technical term *nirjarā*, rejection of accumulated karmas.

designation in the canon itself is *niganṭha*.⁷ The word is used in the plural to refer to the group, for example in the old phrase *ājīvikā ca niganṭhā ca* (Suttanipāta 381), already attested in Asoka’s 7th Pillar Edict. In the singular it mostly appears with a proper name. Thus we meet Saccaka Niganṭhaputta, the *niganṭha* Dīghatapassi, etc. And everyone knows of the proper name Niganṭha Nāt(h)aputta, which refers to the leader of this religious group, otherwise known as Mahāvīra. Nātапutta is a clan-name attested through its Prakrit counterpart Nāyaputta handed down in Jain sources.

The only biographical detail about Mahāvīra himself known from the Pāli tradition seems to be the record that he died at Pāvā. The literary garb which clothes this report, for instance the suggestion that Upāli’s conversion to Buddhism was an indirect reason for Niganṭha Nātапutta’s death or the narrative of subsequent disputes between surviving monks, is no reason to reject it.⁸ Pāvā, a small town in Bihar, is indeed the place Jain Śvetāmbara sources connect with Mahāvīra’s death, and this connection is responsible for the important place Pāvā occupies on the map of Jain *tīrthas*. The Jain leader’s personal image in the Pāli scriptures is rather negative: he did not have a very strong impact on his disciples, if we are to judge, for example, from the Vinaya episode where he failed to prevent Sīha from going to the Buddha, let alone the harsh criticisms of the inconsistency and other defects of his teachings which led to the serious turmoil after his death. As for his charisma, the reports are equally unfavourable: his claims to omniscience and miraculous powers are openly denied.⁹

The very use of the term *niganṭha* as a designation for the Jains is a convincing sign of the faithfulness of the Pāli tradition (both canon and

⁷However, for the sake of convenience, I will throughout conventionally render Pāli *niganṭha* by “Jains”, “Jainism”, etc.

⁸Tena kho pana samayena Niganṭho Nātapputto Pāvāyam adhunā kāla-kato hoti, D III 117.5 = D III 209.24 = M II 243.19–20.

⁹See Dhp-a below (Garahadinna and Sirigutta); Dhp-a III 200–201 (Yamaka-pāṭīhāriyavatthu).

commentaries). The fact that Pāli *niganṭha* is clearly recognized as a Jain term is shown by the etymological explanation occasionally recorded in the Pāli commentaries, an etymology which is ascribed to the Jains and actually attested in their own tradition:

We do not have defilements which are like knots, we are free of the defilements of obstruction, hence the name Niganṭha.¹⁰

This statement accords with Jain texts, where the traditional image of the spiritual “knots” (already known from several Upaniṣads) is felt as being conveyed by the word *niggaṇṭha* in the commentaries.¹¹ Thus Pāli sources do not seem to bear trace of any malicious or derogatory interpretation of the term. The fact that *niganṭha* is used as the normal designation of Jain ascetics in the oldest Jain sources (śramanic poetry as well as disciplinary books) confirms its antiquity. The phonetic aspect of the word (*niganṭha*, with a single -ga-, and the prefix *ni-* instead of *nir-*) are supported by Pkt *niyanṭha* and also point to an old form.¹²

References to Jains occur in two main contexts:

1. The first context, which is mainly represented in the canon itself, portrays a spirit of confrontation, the ultimate aim being to show the superiority of the Buddhist position. These are the dialogues in which a Jain approaches the Buddha with the intention to challenge him. The

¹⁰ *Amhākām ganthana-kileso, palibujhana-kileso natthi, kilesa-gaṇṭhi-rahitā mayan ti evam vāditāya laddha-nāma-vasena Niganṭho*, Ps II 234.8–10 (ad M I 198,12, Niganṭho Nāthaputto).

¹¹ See, for instance, the cūrṇi on the *Sūyagada*: *bajjha-abbhantarāo ganthāo niggao niggaṇṭho*, taken over by the Sanskrit commentary on the *Vyavahāra-sūtra* (quoted in C. Caillat, *Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks* (Ahmedabad, 1975), p. 43, n. 2): *nirgato granthād dravyataḥ suvarṇādi-rūpāt, bhāvato mithyātvādi-lakṣaṇād iti nirgranthah*.

¹² See for instance H. Jacobi, “On Mahāvīra and his predecessors”, *IA* 1880, p. 158 (= *Kleine Schriften* (Wiesbaden, 1970), p. 797); K.R. Norman, “Middle Indo-Aryan Studies II”, *JOIB* 10 (1961), pp. 348–49 = *Collected Papers I* (Oxford: PTS), 1990, pp. 25–26.

conclusion is always the same: the Jain is at a loss for an answer to the Buddha’s questions and is finally confounded, or even converted to the Buddhist fold for good. Upāli is the most famous of these converts.

2. There are texts in both canon and commentaries in which the Jains appear as a group on a par with other non-Buddhist groups. The Jains then stand as one category among those who are quoted as representatives of various doctrines (*tittha*), as outsiders (*bāhiraka*), as followers of wrong viewpoints or “mere views” (*ditthi*).¹³ We should note that Pāli literature distinguishes itself from Brahmanic, Jain, and non-Pāli Buddhist literature in that, as far as I know, it has not developed a science of doxography or compendia of views. In this literary genre, the main features of the doctrines of different groups are summarized; the tenets of various schools are presented one after the other, generally in purely informative fashions, even if the author’s or compiler’s intention is to stress the superiority of his own doctrine. Such is the case in the *sarvadarśanasāṅgrahas* or other *saddarśanasamuccayas*, which have been regarded as the first indigenous steps towards a truly philosophical approach.

In the Pāli scriptures, the existence of a text such as the famous Brahmajālasutta included in the Dīgha-nikāya could be adduced to invalidate the above statements. However, this text remains at a “predoxographic” stage and differs from standard doxographies because its purpose is clearly apologetic. Thus, neither in the canon itself nor in later literature do we find any exposé of non-Buddhist doctrine “in a neutral and non-committal sense”.¹⁴ Any statement or account of other ideologies we read is always presented in comparison with the Buddhist viewpoint, the aim being to demonstrate the invalidity and inferiority of the other doctrine. Although such a situation is not specific to Pāli Buddhism — and is indeed to be expected of any religion which must assert its own position to the detriment of contemporary ideologies — this absence of real doxography should be noted.

¹³ See W. Halbfass, “Observations on *darśana*”, *WZKS* 23 (1979), pp. 198–99.

¹⁴ W. Halbfass, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

In any case, the result is that in Pāli scriptures Jainism always appears in performance and never *in abstracto*. Contextual elements are meaningful. They are part of the rhetoric of persuasion. Thus the conditions in which the Buddhist-Jain dialogue takes place are interesting in themselves. To wit: The common context has individual Niganṭhas going of their own accord to the Buddha for discussion or inquiry. This very fact places them in an inferior position because it is they who are in need of the other's instruction. Facing them, the Buddha appears as a teacher who can never be embarrassed and is much more powerful than Niganṭha Nātaputta himself. For instance, when prince Abhaya, speaking on behalf of his Jain master, comes to question the Buddha about the modes of a Tathāgata's speech, the Buddha immediately understands how tricky and double-edged his question is. The commentary says: "With a single word the Buddha could smash the question which [Abhaya] had been preparing for four months, exactly as a stroke of lightning would crush the top of a mountain."¹⁵

When, elsewhere, the Niganṭha Saccaka expresses his wish to ask a question, the Buddha's answer is "Ask whatever question you wish", and this simple sentence is the starting point for lengthy explanations in the commentary, which states that there is nothing the Buddha cannot consider, that this sentence draws attention to his omniscience and as such makes him different from Pratyekabuddhas or other special beings.¹⁶ The non-Buddhist can only be silenced or regularly entangled in self-contradictions. To take up the words of a commentary: "The Buddha is a hundred times, a thousand times, a hundred thousand times better at debates than a Niganṭha,"¹⁷ and is the only one able to lead his Jain opponent to Enlightenment.¹⁸ So the fact that in Buddhist

¹⁵Ps III 109,¹⁹⁻²¹.

¹⁶Ps II 274.*ff.*

¹⁷Ps II 276,¹⁹⁻²⁰; see also Ps III 110,⁷⁻⁸.

¹⁸Ps II 276.*ff.*: the difference between two categories of individuals: the *sāvaka-veneyyas* who can be enlightened by *sāvakas* and Buddhas, and the *buddha-veneyyas* who can be enlightened only by the Buddhas.

scriptures a Jain approaches a Buddhist is not a matter for surprise: on the contrary, it seems obvious that the former will have much to learn from the latter. But when, exceptionally, a Buddhist approaches a Niganṭha, the oddity of the situation cannot escape the commentator's sharp eye. Thus when the Saṃyutta-nikāya states that "the Buddhist layfollower Citta once went to a Niganṭha", the commentary has:

Why did a Buddhist layman, who has himself mastered traditional learning, who knows the Buddhist teaching, approach a naked Jain deprived of all glamour? — In order to be free from blame and also in order to refute. As a matter of fact, the Jains express the following criticism. They say, "The followers of the monk Gotama resemble stumps of hard acacia wood; they do not receive anybody in a friendly way."¹⁹

This passing remark expresses the tension which must have existed between the members of the two communities. It underlines the fact that the Buddhist follower engages in dialogue with other faiths merely in concession to public opinion, that the dialogue will not be a genuine one, and that it is certainly not motivated by a desire to learn or to be exposed to new ideas! Exactly the opposite takes place when the initiator of the dialogue is a Niganṭha. In such a case, the commentary explains that he does not approach the Buddha with an intention to refute but with an intention to hear the Law.²⁰

The animosity and competition between the two leaders and their followers is emphasized by the commentaries: what prompted Niganṭha Nātaputta to send prince Abhaya to the Buddha was a desire to get even because the Buddha had attracted some lay-followers away from his fold.²¹ When the commander-in-chief Sīha, a Jain lay-follower (*niganṭha-sāvaka*), informs his spiritual leader about his intention to approach Gotama, he is not encouraged to do so, to say the least:

¹⁹Spk III 100.6 on S IV 297–98 (Citta-saṃyutta: 8. Niganṭho).

²⁰E.g. Ps II 280,³¹⁻³³.

²¹Samāno Gotamo mayham sāvake bhinditvā ganhāti, etc., Ps III 108,¹⁵⁻¹⁶ (on M I 392–96: Abhayarājakumāra-sutta).

But how can you, Sīha, being one who asserts an ought-to-be-done, go to see the recluse Gotama who asserts an ought-not-to-be done? For, Sīha, the recluse Gotama asserts an ought-not-to-be-done, he teaches a doctrine of an ought-not-to-be-done, and in that he trains disciples.²²

Advice that he does not obey.

The methods of teaching are a part of the apologetic strategy as well. There are of course several cases in the *suttas* where the Buddha slowly convinces his opponent of his wrong views by instilling his own right views and adjusting his discourse to him.²³ But there are also situations in which real argumentation is conspicuously absent and replaced by a show of almost miraculous powers. See, for instance, the story of Garahadinna, a lay-follower of the Niganṭhas, and Sirigutta, a Buddhist lay-follower, told in the commentary of the Dhammapada. The Niganṭhas' claim to omniscience — knowledge of past, present and future — is harshly satirized and fully annihilated on the day they come for food to Sirigutta. Having been unable to detect the trap the Buddhist layman has set for them, they all fall into a ditch and get a thrashing. When the Buddha's turn comes, he already has the advantage of suspecting that the Niganṭhas are going to retaliate and can thus prepare himself. His method for converting the Jain layman is to impress the public by producing a miracle: lotus flowers spring up from charcoal.²⁴ Here there is no dialogue, only open conflict resulting in installing a

balance of power between two irreconcilable opponents. One wins, the other loses altogether.

The investigation which follows does not pretend to be exhaustive. It will single out a few striking points about Jainism which are highlighted in the Pāli scriptures.

First comes the problem of the relationship between the heretic teacher called Niganṭha Nātaputta and the doctrine of the "fourfold restraint" (*cātu-yāma-saṃvara*) ascribed to him in the nikāyas, especially in the Dīgha-nikāya (Sāmaññaphala-sutta and Udumbarikā-sīhanāda-sutta), but also in the Upālisutta of the Majjhima-nikāya and in a stanza of the Samyutta-nikāya, where a god speaking for Niganṭha Nātaputta describes him as "protected by the fourfold restraint".²⁵ For the last occurrence, indication of the meaning of the compound *cātu-yāma-saṃvara* is found only in the commentary. As far as the three other occurrences are concerned, information is available in the suttas themselves, but is not consistent. The Sāmaññaphala-sutta and the Upāli-sutta expand *cātu-yāma-saṃvara* by the four compounds *sabba-vāri-vārita*, *sabba-vāri-yutta*, *sabba-vāri-dhuta* and *sabba-vāri-phuṭṭha*.²⁶

Some translators understand that the first restraint (*sabba-vāri-vārita*) concerns water, following the commentaries, which generally take the first *vāri* to mean "water" in reference to the ban on cold water, whereas they render the three other *vāris* as *vāraṇa*. Such a discordance is hard to accept because in a stylistic concatenation such as this one, an identical meaning is to be expected for all the occurrences of the same word — unless word play is at work. Now, Jain sources where both a similar expression with an etymological figure and a Pkt *vāri* with the meaning "restraint" occur strongly speak in favour of the translation

²²Vin I 233.27ff.; I.B. Horner's translation (*Book of the Discipline* IV, p. 318).

²³For examples of this process see R. Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditional Genesis of the Early Teachings* (London, 1996).

²⁴Dhp-a I 434ff.

²⁵D I 57f., III 48; M I 377; S I 66.17*.

²⁶See also Spk I 127.1-8 on S I 66.

“restrained by all restraints” — which is clearly the correct one.²⁷ There is no reason to disagree with this analysis at the level of the canon itself. However, I would like to indicate that the reason Buddhaghosa may have felt entitled to introduce a reference to “water” at some point in this discussion is that in the Upāli-sutta passage where our sequence of compounds occurs, the Jain specific habits and scruples towards the use of cold water are precisely the object of focus. This very feature of the Nigaṇṭha’s life provides a basis for the well-known discussion on the relative importance of physical violence compared to mental violence:

There might be a Jain here who, although sick, suffering, very ill, refuses cold water and takes [only] warm water.²⁸

The commentator is well aware of this rule as characterizing the Jains, as well as of its real motivation. He explains: “The Jains refuse cold water because they understand it contains living beings.”²⁹ He is also remarkably conscious of the double connotation of the compound *sabba-vāri-vārīta*, understanding it to refer to the rejection of cold water or (*athavā*) to abstaining from all evil.³⁰ Thus it looks as if the Buddhists were deeply struck by the Jain ascetic custom of not using cold water — as other external observers of the Jains have often been — and found it both basic and distinctive.

²⁷K.R. Norman, “Pāli Lexicographical Studies IV: Eleven Pāli Etymologies”, *JPTS* 11 (1987), pp. 41–44 = *Collected Papers* III (Oxford: PTS, 1992), pp. 167–69. Apart from *Isibhāsiyām* 29.19 (*savva-vārīhiṃ vārie*) one can also adduce *vāriya-savva-vāri* and *vāriya-savva-vāram* from the commentaries on *Sūyagaḍa* 1.6.28 (as proposed by K. Watanabe, *BEI* 5 (1987), pp. 375–86).

²⁸I.B. Horner’s translation, vol. 2, p. 41. *Idh’assa nigaṇṭho ābādhiko dukkhito bālha-gilāno sītodako-paṭikkhitto uṇhodaka-paṭisevī*, M I 376.23–25.

²⁹*Sītodaka-paṭikkhitto ti Nigaṇṭhā satta-saññāya sītodakam paṭikkhipanti tam sandhāy’ etam vuttam*, Ps III 57.4.

³⁰*Sabbavāriyārito ti vārita-sabba-udako, paṭikkhitta-sabba-sītodako ti attho. so hi sītodore satta-saññī hoti, tasmā tam na valañjeti, athavā sabbavāriyārito ti sabbena pāpa-vārañena vārita-pāpo*. Ps III 58.22–25, and Sv 168.1–2 = Spk I 127.3–5 (without the second interpretation). Already referred to in *Jaina Sūtras*, p. xix. On this topic see also below p. 23.

It is equally interesting to see how the sub-commentaries explain the compounds *sabba-vāri-vārīta*, *sabba-vāri-yutto*, etc., and differentiate them by placing them in a clear Jain soteriological frame. Thus for the *Sumaṅgalavilāsīnī-tīkā*, *vāra* (“restraint”) in *sabbena pāpa-vārañena yutto* means *samvara*, a common Jain technical term for the process of warding off entry into the soul of new karmic matter; *dhuta* (“shaken off”) in *dhuta-pāpa* is equal to *nijjara*, a process complementary to the preceding one and which aims at expelling the karmic matter already present in the soul; and *phuṭṭha* “reached” is expanded as “reaching liberation, i.e. destroying all karmas, through the rejection of all the eight karmas”.³¹ This last detail is an even clearer indication of the commentator’s familiarity with specific, albeit common, Jain terminology and concept. The eight classes of karmas are indeed a *topos* of Jain dogmatics as early as the canon.³²

Whatever the detail, the above definition of the “fourfold restraint” may look somewhat strange because it does not form the list of elements one is entitled to expect in the case of a compact expression containing a figure. The *Udumbarika-sīhanāda-sutta* provides what we are looking for:

The ascetic protectively shrouded in the protective shroud of the fourfold restraint

- (i) destroys no life; lets no life be destroyed; enjoys not the company of one who destroys life;
- (ii) he takes not that which is not given to him ...;
- (iii) he speaks no untruth ...;

³¹*Sv-pṭ* I 298.14–19; see below n. 88 on the interpretation of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta’s doctrine given in the Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra as incorporated into the Saṅghabheda-vastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, and below pp. 34–35 concerning *saṃvara*, *nijjara* and *mokkha*.

³²E.g. in *Viyāhapannatti* 8.10 (see P. Dundas, *The Jains* (London, 1992), p. 85). They are (1) knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa-k.*); (2) perception-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa-k.*); (3) feeling-karma (*vedanīya-k.*); (4) delusory (*mohanīya-k.*); (5) life-karma (*āyus-k.*); (6) name-karma (*nāma-k.*); (7) clan-karma (*gotra-k.*); (8) obstacle-karma (*antarāya-k.*).

(iv) he aspires not to the object of his imagination.³³

As early as 1880 and 1895, H. Jacobi convincingly identified this with the teachings of the twenty-third Jina, Pārśva; and despite Rhys Davids's rejection,³⁴ Jacobi's view must be accepted. The Pāli text tallies perfectly with the concept of *cāujjāma* as defined in the Jain *Thānaṅga*. Moreover, the reference to the three viewpoints from which the actions are considered — being done directly, through an intermediary, or through mere approval — is well in accordance with the general Jain formulation of the so-called “great” ascetic vows. Further, the Pāli text of the fourth restraint helps us understand the rare Prakrit term *bahiddhādāna* which occurs in the corresponding rule. The somewhat general wording used by both traditions implies that it comprises all sorts of external objects which cause the mind to be distracted. When the Jain tradition adopted the fivefold list of restraints devised by Mahāvīra, at which time only this became authoritative, the fourth restraint was then re-interpreted as referring both to the rule of non-possession and to the rule of celibacy.

It is remarkable that the Pāli scriptures know not only of the four restraints prescribed for Jain monks — as just seen — but also those prescribed for Jain laymen (*sāvakānam dhamma-*): destroying living beings, taking what is not given, acting wrongly in respect of sensual passions, and telling lies are mentioned elsewhere and said to lead to rebirth in hell.³⁵ This shows that “we would, perhaps, have to differentiate between the Jainistic body of ideas and the person of the niganṭha

³³See A. Mette, “The Synchronism of the Buddha and the Jina Mahāvīra and the Problem of Chronology in Early Jainism”, in *The Dating of the Historical Buddha*, Part I, ed. by H. Bechert (Göttingen, 1991), p. 136.

³⁴See Dīgha-nikāya translation p. 75 n. 1: “Prof. Jacobi thinks the Four Restraints are intended to represent the four vows kept by the followers of Pārśva. But this surely cannot be so, for these vows were quite different.” For Jacobi's point of view see “On Mahāvīra and his predecessors”, IA, June 1880, pp. 160–61 (= *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden, 1970, pp. 799–800) and *Jaina Sūtras*, pp. xx–xxi.

³⁵S IV 317.27–33.

Nātaputta who appears in Buddhistic didactic texts as representative of this movement”,³⁶ as A. Mette puts it. In other words, although the Pāli canon speaks of Niganṭha Nātaputta, whom it knew to be the same as Mahāvīra, it hands down the doctrine specific to his predecessor Pārśva; this suggests that the Niganṭha order was not a newly founded one in Buddha's time and had not yet been reformed.

Who were the Niganṭha mendicants of the Pāli scriptures? How do they fit in with our knowledge of the later development of Jain sects and their fundamental division into Digambaras (“sky clad, naked”) and Śvetāmbaras (“white clothed”)? In other words, how do we address the vexed issue of nudity, for which it is very difficult to give a clear answer? Significant progress has been achieved in recent years, through studies such as D. Schlingloff's “Jainas and Other ‘Heretics’ in Buddhist Art” and especially through P.S. Jaini's “Jaina Monks from Mathura: Literary Evidence for Their Identification in Kuṣāṇa Sculptures”,³⁷ but we must face the fact that the testimony of the Pāli scriptures is often contradictory.

The lists of groups of ascetics supplied by the Pāli canon are hard to interpret. A stock passage of the Saṃyutta-nikāya (repeated in the Udāna)³⁸ mentions the Niganṭhas, the *acela(ka)s* (“those without clothes”), the *ekasāṭakas* (“those with one garment”), and presumed Brahmanic groups (*jatilas*). If we assume at the outset that in such lists all terms refer to individually distinct groups and that the terms are not

³⁶Op. cit., p. 134. Cf. p. 137: “The interpreters of early Buddhist sources should turn their attention to the fact that Buddhist remarks which appear to refer to Jainism, possibly reach back in the past, to a time when the person of Mahāvīra had not yet reached its later importance. Even if they may first have been formulated and recorded a certain time after the Buddha's death, these Buddhist remarks are the oldest testimonies that inform us of the person of Mahāvīra”.

³⁷Published respectively in *Jainism and Prakrit in Ancient and Medieval India: Essays for Prof. Jagdish Chandra Jain* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), pp. 71–82, and in *BSOAS* 58,3 (1995), pp. 479–94.

³⁸S I 78.1 = Ud 65.5.

quasi-synonyms, we have to determine what differentiates them. And this is precisely what we are unable to do for the Niganṭhas. Since the term is devoid of descriptive content and does not seem to refer to the appearance or attire of the ascetics as do the other terms, we could suppose that the *acelakas* and *ekasāṭakas* are subdivisions of the Niganṭhas. On the other hand, as evidence for Niganṭha Nātaputta's nudity we may adduce the passage of the *Devaputta-samyutta* where the ascetic "protected by the fourfold restraint" is mocked as "a nude, liar, and leader of pupils" by his opponent.³⁹

A much later source for information on the Niganṭha's appearance is the Pāli commentaries (which in their final form date about one millennium after the Buddha and Mahāvīra and certainly long after the split between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras, which is alleged to have taken place in the first century A.D.). A significant passage of the Dhammapada-āṭṭhakathā shows that the Niganṭhas differ from the Ājīvikas: while the latter "go entirely naked, they, at least wear a covering in front."⁴⁰ Buddhaghosa expresses the same contrast in the *Manorathapūraṇī* where he says that the Ājīvikas are naked ascetics, *nagga-pabbajita*, whereas the Nirgranthas "are covered in their front parts".⁴¹

There are hints from other commentaries. While describing various heretic groups in the *Udāna-āṭṭhakathā*, Dhammapāla makes use of the compound *nagga-niganṭha*.⁴² In Buddhaghosa's *Sāratthappakāśinī* as well, a Niganṭha is said to be naked.⁴³ This seems to have been the prevalent view, to the extent that some translators did not hesitate to understand the two terms as strictly equivalent. See for instance Burlingame's rendering of Niganṭha by "The Naked" in the

³⁹ S I 66,30*.

⁴⁰ Dhp-a III 489,18–20.

⁴¹ Ājīvako ti nagga-pabbajito, niganṭho ti purimabhāga-paṭicchanno, Mp III 334. qff. on A III 276,34 (quoted by Schlingloff, *op. cit.*, p. 71).

⁴² Ud-a 338,22.

⁴³ Spk III 100,7.

Dhammapada-āṭṭhakathā. This perception was current at least from the sixth to the eighth century A.D., where *nirgrantha* = *nagnāṭaka* in non-Pāli Buddhist scriptures, as well as outside.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Dhammapāla's *Udāna* commentary also says that the Niganṭhas "wear white cloth" (*setapaṭa-niganṭha-rūpa-dhārino*).⁴⁵

Finally, a passage from the Samantapāśādikā deserves special notice precisely because it deals with the costumes of various ascetic groups, with the concern that they should not be adopted by Buddhist monks. There we find the phrase *yathā setapaṭā addhapālikā niganṭhā pārupanti*,⁴⁶ in which *addhapālika* must be in some way connected with Skt *ardhaphālaka* used in some Jain Digambara texts, and thus would be the earliest record of the term. The *ardhaphālakas* are unclothed ascetics who hold in their hands a single piece of cloth in such a way as to cover their nudity when begging for alms. They can be seen on Mathura sculptures. P.S. Jaini's identification of the *ekasāṭakas* of the Pāli canon with the Jain *ardhaphālakas* does not seem to apply to the Samantapāśādikā passage (which he did not consider) because there the *ekasāṭakas* come separately in the list. Moreover, the description of the way they dress is quite different. The interpretation of this conflicting information is problematic. Taken together, Dhammapāla's statements could mean that he was aware of the existence of two Jain orders, who could be the forerunners of the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras. This

⁴⁴ See Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* on the *Abhidharmaśāstra* 405,20; Prajñavarman's commentary on the *Viśeṣastava* vv. 26 and 51 (Skt *nirgrantha* = Tib. *gcer bu*, *gcer bu pa*) in J. Schneider, *Der Lobpreis der Vorzüglichkeit des Buddha*, Indica et Tibetica 23 (Bonn, 1993). — Commentary on the *Bṛhajātaka* 15,1 (cited by Schlingloff, *op. cit.*, p. 71); the Jain doctrine is called *vivasana-samaya* in Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2,2,33; etc.

⁴⁵ Ud-a 330,20; compare Ja V 427,23' *seta-samaṇī* (Saccatapāvī); see Bollée, *Kuṇälajātaka* (London: PTS, 1970), p. 137, "This may be a sneer at the Jainas as is suggested by Francis though they are usually called Niganṭhas. One could also think of the female counterpart of śvetabhiṣu which Sandesara [in JOIB 16 (1966), pp. 120ff.] takes to mean Ājīvika."

⁴⁶ Sp 1213,6.

is chronologically possible, since the split between the “white clad” and the “naked” apparently took place in the beginning of the Christian era.

The question remains whether *nagga* should be understood literally as a straightforward designation of the proto-Digambaras, or as an approximation or extended use. In the second case the word could be applied to ascetics who only have with them a piece of cloth in their hands — whether they are called *ekasātakas* or *ardhaphālakas*. They could be described as “naked” because they do not wear any cloth permanently. This extended use of the word would in effect lead to a confusion between Niganṭhas and other non-Buddhist groups, especially Ājīvikas (who are actually naked). As a matter of fact, some texts suggest that there was indeed a certain amount of confusion or assimilation. The formulaic style, often used in the Buddhist and Jain texts, may well have favoured such a confusion. Thus the phrase *nagga-bhogga nissirīka* is applied to an Ājīvika ascetic in the prose of a Jātaka, but to a Niganṭha in a commentary.⁴⁷

To give another example: what are we to think of Acela-Kassapa’s description of his thirty years of ascetic life as “nothing else than nakedness, a shaven head and dusting away the gravel”,⁴⁸ when we know that nakedness can be an outward sign of entering the order as an Ājīvika or a Jain monk? What are we to think of the extremely strict rules for begging said to be adopted by the Ājīvikas and the numerous cases prohibiting the acceptance of food which are listed in the Dīghanikāya (Kassapa-Sīhanāda-sutta), when the litany is so reminiscent of what can be read in the Dasaveyāliya-sutta?⁴⁹

Information about the daily routine of the Jain monk has been collected from Pāli sources by W.B. Bollée, who lists significant stereotyped phrases describing food-habits and other behaviour, and shows

⁴⁷ Spk III 100,6, Ja VI 225,14.

⁴⁸ *Natthi koci ... aññatra naggeyyā ca munḍeyyā ca pāvāla-nipphoṭanāya ca*, S IV 300,25-27.

⁴⁹ Compare D I 166,2ff. and the prescriptions included in *Dasaveyāliya-sutta* 5,1.

how they are corroborated by comparable data in Jain texts.⁵⁰ Plucking out of the hair is an important Jain practice, and was perhaps also known to the Ājīvikas. In the Pāli scriptures it is criticized as characterizing the heretics,⁵¹ and, significantly, *keśōlluñcana* (nt.) is also singled out as one of the words listed in the *tīrthika*-section of the *Mahāvyutpatti*. When the *Therīgāthā* (107) depicts the life of Bhaddā as a former Jain nun, she is said to be *lūna-kesī*. Dhammapāla’s precise statement that plucking out was done by applying ashes to the roots of the hair in order to make the process smoother shows his familiarity with its practical side.⁵²

In the Visuddhimaggā-mahātīkā the same custom is mentioned in illustration of the wrong view that self-mortification (*attakilamathānu-yoga*) is the means to liberation. Although the custom is not explicitly ascribed to the Jains in the text, the use of the technical term *kesaluñcana*, along with the equally technical term *anasana* “fasting” or even “fasting unto death”, not attested with this meaning outside Jain contexts, and a reference to nakedness (*nagga-sīla*) are unmistakable.⁵³ Similarly a part of the life of the nun Nanduttarā before her conversion to Buddhism has a distinct Jain flavour, as she is said to have undertaken many vows (*bahu-vata-samādānā*), to have shaven half her head (*addham sīsassa olikhīm*, cty *muṇḍemi*), to have slept on the ground, and to have abstained from eating at night (*ratt'-ūparatā*).⁵⁴ They all

⁵⁰ See W.B. Bollée “Anmerkungen zum buddhistischer Häretikerbild”, ZDMG 121,1 (1971), pp. 70–92.

⁵¹ E.g. Sp 1021,16 and the texts based on it.

⁵² Th-a II 119,39–40 (on Th 283 *kesā-massum alocayīm*, concerning the Ājīvika-follower Jambuka); see also Thī-a I 107,1ff. (on Thī 107, just mentioned).

⁵³ *Anasana-kesaluñcanādi-tapa-cariyāya nagga-sīla ... ādīhi ca atta-paritāpanena mokkho hotī ti atta-kilamatho*, Vism-mhṭ 1157,13–14 (= 2.218 of the Burmese edition on CSCD).

⁵⁴ Thī 88ff. (whereas Thī 87 rather refers to Brahmanic customs). Even if the practice of not eating at night cannot be defined as strictly Jain (in view of D I 5,5 for instance) the use of the term at this point of the spiritual career of Nanduttarā may indicate that she later on gave it up, which she would not have done, had it been a basic rule of Buddhist monastic life. — As for

appear as symbols of the extremely painful ascetic practices favoured by the Jains and dismissed as ineffective by the Middle Path, as explained in several sermons of the Buddha. Thus, for instance, Buddhist ascetics do not pluck out their hair (*luñc-*) or shave (*mund-*), they have it done by a barber (*kappakena kesa-massūni ohārapetvā*). In brief, a strong connection between severe asceticism and Jainism has become a commonplace and a striking feature for outsiders, as is seen from non-Pāli Buddhist sources as well.⁵⁵

Among religious practices, the so-called *niganṭha-uposatha* is one of the three varieties of *uposatha* described in the Aṅguttara-nikāya:

The Niganṭhas invite the layman thus : “Set aside violence (*dandam nikhipāhi*) as regards all creatures that exist eastwards beyond a hundred yojanas, likewise towards the east, towards the west, towards the north and towards the south.” ... They call their laypeople on the fasting days, saying “Come here, sir. Abandoning all your clothes, speak thus : ‘I belong to no one; I am nothing to anyone. I own nothing ; nothing owns me.’ ”⁵⁶

The rhetoric of the passage is meaningful and sounds authentic in content and style. In terms of content, it includes the basic elements of independent “vows” such as the *anartha-danda-vrata*, the vow to abstain from harmful activities, the *dig-* or *deśāvakāśika-vrata*, a vow

Isidāsi’s verses (Thī 400ff.), which have been considered to have a Jain flavour (by Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. xxii), for example in 431cd (*pāpam hi mayā pakatam kammam tam nijjaressāmi*), they are problematic since Isidāsi is clearly said to be a Buddhist *bhikkhunī* (400). Had she been a householder, then a Jain, then a Buddhist, the last part of her conversion story would be missing.

⁵⁵See Prajñavarman’s Udānavarga-vivarana II.13 (edition by M. Balk (Bonn, 1984): 174.29): “The Nirgrantha has such a view, such a statement, to wit : ‘The very liberation is to be desired by means of harsh austerities’”; IV.10 (254.17): “The Nirgrantas, because they desire liberation, practise extremely difficult austerities”. (Translations provided by P. Skilling.)

⁵⁶A I 206.8ff.; translation from *Jaina Path* p. 223. This passage had been translated and examined by H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sūtras*, pp. xvii–xix, but his conclusions need revision. Another passing reference to *niganṭha-uposatha* in Ud-a 296.7.

concerned with the spatial restriction of the area where activity is performed, and the *poṣadha-vrata*, mainly characterized by fasting. At an early date these elements were combined in what is known as the *sāmāyika* ritual, which Jains view as a means for a layman to temporarily renounce everyday activity and cultivate equal feelings towards all beings. For the limited period during which he decides to perform *sāmāyika*, the layman is “similar to a monk”, as the texts say, giving up for a time all possessions which tie him to the world. Clothes are of course highly symbolic in this respect, and they are indeed given up by today’s Digambara laymen in such a context.⁵⁷

Clear affirmation of the basic freedom and detachment expressed by the formula “I own nothing, nothing owns me”, quite common in Jain scriptures, is also a part of this ritual and declares the layman’s “determination to ultimately renounce for ever”.⁵⁸ The style of the Pāli passage also looks authentic. It is in conformity with available Jain literature, where we read that such rituals are conducted under the guidance of a spiritual master, and as such always imply a verbal exchange with both the invitation from the master and the recitation of formulas on the lay disciple’s side. Nevertheless, a literal understanding of the statements ascribed to the Jains leads to a biased and restricted analysis: when the layman is exhorted to kindness towards creatures that exist in a certain direction beyond a certain limit, the Pāli text interprets it as partial compassion; when he expresses his detachment, it is understood as falsehood, because his family bonds are still in existence. The text does this quite skillfully, since the description of every feature of the ceremony is immediately followed by a demolishing critique. Finally, at the conclusion, the apparent faithfulness of the picture handed down by the Aṅguttara-nikāya is totally spoiled:

Then, as soon as that night has passed, [the layman] reclaims all that he has “given away”. This I declare is as good as stealing.

⁵⁷See *Jaina Path*, p. 223.

⁵⁸*Jaina Path*, loc. cit.

In other words, a ritual meant to promote inner purity is portrayed as a blunt transgression of precisely those rules which are regarded as fundamental: abstention from violence, from falsehood, from taking that which is not given! This openly hostile critique betrays an approach which confines itself to the external forms and, because of its apologetic perspective, refuses or is not in a position to understand the underlying spirit. True, the Jain layman does return to daily life and its impedimenta after the ceremony, but the repeated performance of *sāmāyika* helps him in his spiritual progress and gradually instils in him an increased wish for permanent renunciation. Moreover, non-possession (technically called *aparigraha*) is considered by Jains to be a mental state as much as an objective reality: an individual may lead the life of a layman and at the same time be free from the ties arising from avidity and other passions. At any rate, it is interesting to observe that the Buddhists were not alone in criticizing the *nigantha-uposatha*. That it was a controversial ritual, liable to be misunderstood by outsiders, is proved by similar criticisms ascribed to the Ājīvikas against the Jains and by the need the latter felt to clarify the ambiguous status of the layman in such a situation: a dialogue read in the fifth *anīga* of the Jain canon (the Viyāhapannatti) follows similar lines of argument:⁵⁹

Suppose a layman is seated in a monks' lodge performing *sāmāyika* and at this time his belongings are removed by somebody. Now, after completing his *sāmāyika*, if the said *śrāvaka* searches for his stolen things, does he search for his own belongings or someone else's belongings? — For his own.

⁵⁹ Viyāhapannatti VIII 5 (Bombay: Jaina-Āgama-Series edition, 1974), Part I, p. 354ff.; Suttāgame I (Gurgaon, 1953), pp. 548ff.). Despite the adequate analytical summary available in J. Deleu, *Viyāhapannatti* (Bhagavaī) (Brugge, 1970; reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-dass, 1996), p. 148, I here prefer to give a translation of the whole passage (see below). Deleu has also mentioned it in connection with other evidence regarding the interfaith dialogue: "Lord Mahāvīra and the Anyatīrthikas", in *Mahāvīra and His Teachings*, ed. A.N. Upadhye *et al.* (Bombay, 1977), pp. 187–93.

Suppose a layman has accepted the vow of conduct, restraint, renunciation, atonement and fasting, for such a one, do the belongings so stolen become non-belongings for him? — Yes, they do.

If that be so, then how do you maintain that while searching for these, he searches for his own belongings and not for someone else's belongings? — A layman who is seated in a *sāmāyika* feels that "silver is not mine, wealth, grains, pearls, gems, conchs, diamonds, jewels are not mine". But then he has not renounced his "mineness", for which I maintain that he searches for his own belongings, and not for someone else's belongings.

Suppose a layman is seated in *sāmāyika* in the monks' lodge when, per chance, a rogue enjoys the company of his wife; then, does he enjoy the company of the layman's wife or of the layman's non-wife? — Surely, he enjoys the company of the layman's wife.

Suppose the layman is under the vow of conduct, etc., then does the wife become non-wife? — Yes, she does.

If that be so, how do you maintain that the rogue enjoys the company of the layman's wife, not of his non-wife? — A layman who is under the vow of conduct, etc., has a feeling in his mind that "my mother is not mine, my father is not mine, my brother is not mine, my sister is not mine, my wife is not mine, my son is not mine", but his link of affection with them is not broken."⁶⁰

That at least the Pāli commentators had some acquaintance not only with major Jain practices but also with their intrinsic motivations as viewed by the Jains themselves has already been briefly indicated in the discussion of *vāri* and its connection with water. It is also shown by a story in the Dhammapada-āṭhakathā. When some Buddhist monks argue that the Niganṭhas are better than the *acelakas* because they cover their front parts, and therefore show a sense of shame (*sahirikā*), the Niganṭhas reply that shame is not the determining motivation:

⁶⁰ *Bhagavatī Sūtra*, English translation by K.C. Lalwani, Vol. III. (Calcutta: Jain Bhawan, 1980), pp. 185–87 (with some changes and abridgments).

There are creatures, they say, such as dirt and dust which are provided with sense and life. We cover in order that they should not fall in the vessels we use for getting alms.⁶¹

As P.S. Jaini notes,⁶² the passage attests to Dhammapāla's accuracy. It is a clear reference to the Jain conception of *ahimsā*. Protection of minute living beings is indeed the reason the Jains adduce for using a covering cloth for the alms bowl, whether they wear clothes or not. At the same time, the Niganṭhas' remark serves as a starting point for a polemic which is echoed in various Jain texts. The Buddhists' arguments adduced in the remaining part of the story are precisely the stock arguments of the opponents of the Digambaras, and they in part reveal why this group of naked ascetics has declined at some periods of history. Their nudity has been misinterpreted as a sort of shocking exhibitionism, while they themselves understand it as a sign of detachment, abandonment of possessions and overcoming of passions, while the Śvetābaras themselves list nakedness among the casual troubles (*parīsaha*) which monks may have to overcome.⁶³ Thus the Buddhist position expressed in the Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā is representative of the position of all external and unsympathetic observers, and it produces a caricature of the almost pathological care of the Jains for all forms of life and their proverbial *ahimsā*.

This anecdote is one of the texts that focuses on the conception of *ekendriya-jīvas*, those beings who have only the sense of touch.⁶⁴ As early as their canonical scriptures, the Jains recognize five classes of

⁶¹ *Pamsu-rajādayo pi pana puggalā eva jīvit'-indriya-paṭibaddhā, evañ ca te no bhikkhā-bhājanesu mā patimṣu, iminā kāraṇena paṭicchādemā ti*, Dhp-a III 490.1-3 (on Dhp 316-17).

⁶² "Jaina Monks from Mathura", p. 489. This passage had already been briefly commented upon by H. Jacobi, "On Mahāvīra and His Predecessors" (1880), p. 159 (= *Kleine Schriften*, p. 798).

⁶³ See Dundas, *The Jains*, p. 44.

⁶⁴ I here try briefly to summarize (and supplement) what can be gathered from the information found in L. Schmithausen, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism* (Tokyo, 1991).

such living beings: earth bodies, water bodies, fire bodies, air bodies, and plants. Although the situation is rather intricate, there are clear hints to show that whenever reference is made to this question in the Pāli scriptures, it is taken as an external belief, coming from the "people", more likely from certain people, namely non-Buddhist groups, whose pressure is instrumental in creating rules for the protection of plants, earth and fire, although it cannot be recognized as such.⁶⁵ But it is not openly and straightforwardly shared and adopted by Buddhist ascetics as a concept. On the contrary, sporadic references suggest that the belief is clearly deemed specific to the Jains (or the Ājīvikas): *ek'indriyan ti kāy'-indriyenēva ek'indriyam, niganṭhānam acelakānam matam*, says the Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā (6th-7th cent.), or *khapanaka-bhāsāya rukkho pi pāni*, says a commentary on the Abhidhānappadīpikā.⁶⁶ Such statements would surely not be found had the idea made its way into Theravādin ideology. Moreover, as indicated by L. Schmithausen, the word *ekendriya* has no true counterpart outside Pāli sources.⁶⁷

The clearest example is the debate opposing Buddhists and non-Buddhists regarding the drinking of unboiled water in the Milinda-pañha.⁶⁸ In view of what has been said earlier regarding the interpretation of *vāri* as "water" in the commentaries and the strong connection between refusal of cold water and Niganṭhas, these *titthiyas* are certainly Jains. Their refusal is motivated by the presence of one-sensed beings in the water (*udakam jīvati ... ek'indriyam samanā Sakyaputtiyā*

⁶⁵ See Schmithausen, *op. cit.*, § 5.4-5.5, 9.1f., 10.1; § 15.2 ; § 17.1.

⁶⁶ Respectively p. 379 (§ 969) and p. 364 (§ 545) of the Burmese editions (references traced through the CSCD). For non-Pāli Buddhist sources see, for instance, the Tarkajvālā on Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā, p. 230 in Sh. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo, 1980), p. 230 (nine subdivisions of *jīvas* according to the number of senses they have: one for earth, water, fire, wind, and plants; two for certain kinds of insects; three for others; four for yet others; five for quadrupeds, birds, and human beings) and the Vimalaprabhā-ṭīkā on the Laghukālacakratantra (Sarnath, 1986), p. 269 (*sad-jīva-kāya*).

⁶⁷ *Op. cit.*, n. 78.

⁶⁸ Mil 258.28-62.17 (VI.10 *Udakam jīvati?*).

jīvam vihethenti); this presence is not admitted by the Buddhists who refute it. Similarly, care for particles of earth in the form of dust and their gentle removal is mentioned with reference to the *acela* Kassapa, who, like today's Digambara monks, carries a bunch of peacock's feathers and uses it for this purpose at the time of sitting.⁶⁹ This instrument is listed among various insignia (*linga*) characterizing non-Buddhist ascetics.⁷⁰

As a crucial tenet of Jainism since the earliest period, *ahimsā* and violence along with their consequences were naturally a central issue in the Buddhist-Jain discussions. A striking instance of the conflicting views of the two movements is transmitted in the short *Telovādajātaka* (No. 246). Its two stanzas run as follows:

Being unrestrained, he offers a gift after having given injury, after having inflicted suffering, after having killed. The one who eats such a food is stained by evil (*so pāpen' upalippati*).

Being unrestrained, he offers a gift, even after having killed his entire family. Even if he eats, a wise being is not stained by evil (*na pāpen' upalippati*).⁷¹

The second verse is clearly an answer to the first and a rejection of the standpoint expressed therein. At this textual level the conflicting

⁶⁹ *Bhūmiyam nisīdantassa āsana-tthāne laggānam paṃsu-raja-vālikānam phoṭan'-atthān gahita-mora-piñja-mattato*, Spk III 101,8–11 (on S IV 300,25–27). This instrument is known as *mayūra-piccha*, *picchikā*, *picchī* among the Digambaras for the religious act known as *pratilekhana*, inspection of the ground in order to avoid harming minute living beings.

⁷⁰ Sp 1021,18 and all the Vinaya texts based on it.

⁷¹ *Hantvā jhatvā vadhitvā ca deti dānam asaññato edisam bhattam bhuñjāno* (so read) *so pāpen' upalippati. putta-dāram pi ce hantvā deti dānam asaññato bhuñjamāno pi sa-ppañño na pāpen' upalippati.*

(Ja II 262,27*–28* and 263,6*–7*)

Emended text with elision (E^e *pāpēna upalippati* in both cases) and present participle of the rarer variety in -āna in the first stanza (E^e *bhuñjamāno*). For the same situation with the same verb, see S I 5,5* *bhuñjānānañ*, quoted by O. von Hinüber, *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick* (Vienna, 1986), § 491.

speakers remain unidentified. That both could have been Buddhists of diverging opinions, or a “fool” and a wise person of any persuasion (as the variant title, *Bālovāda-jātaka*, might suggest) cannot be excluded. But for the prose of the *paccuppanna-vatthu* and of the *samodhāna*, the identity of the fool is not in doubt: he is Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta himself, while the one who admonishes him is the Buddha. That such a connection can be established is significant in itself, for it proves that respective views on the topic expressed in the verses were felt to be a kind of sectarian mark.

The statement of the first stanza would indeed be acceptable to a Jain. As is well known, *dāna* is discussed in detail in the Jain scriptures and very strict rules have been devised to guarantee its ethical character. Among the various categories, a gift of food occupies the foremost place as it is of such great importance in sustaining the ascetics. In order to be pure and acceptable, the food offered must fulfill strict conditions both on the side of the donor and on the side of the receiver. The donor should give food which fits the dietary rules of monastic discipline, he should give it at the right time and at the right place, in the right manner and with an appropriate state of mind. If he has committed some act of violence, the last condition is violated. But the responsibility is equally shared by the ascetic, who, as stated in rather early texts such as the Āyāraṅga (II), must be careful about the origin of gifts made to him.

In the Jātaka, the Buddhist reply is expressed in rather crude terms and denies that the donor's behaviour has any ethical value. For the Jains, this amounts to justifying the worst, and means that anything whatsoever can be done provided the mental state is pure. Although the Jātaka stanzas do not seem to have any verbal parallel in the oldest parts of the Jain canon, the following three verses from the Sūyagada (2,6,26–28), which are supposed to express the opinion of the Buddhists, follow the same line of thought and form a sort of echo to the Jātaka, all the more so since they have a similar refrain:

- (i) If someone puts a ball of oil cake on a spit and roasts it with the idea, this is a man; or a gourd, thinking it to be a small boy; in our opinion he is soiled with killing a living being (*sa lippat pāṇa-vahēṇa*

amham). (ii) On the other hand, however, if a *mleccha* puts a man on a spit and roasts him, taking him for an oil-cake, or does the same to a small boy he thinks is a gourd, in our opinion he is not soiled with killing a living being (*na lippāt pāṇa-vahēṇa amham*). (iii) If someone puts a man or a small boy on a spit and roasts it on a fire taking it for a lump of oil-cake, it is legally acceptable for Buddhists as a fast-breaking meal (*Buddhāna tam kappai pāranae*).⁷²

The question of violence and cannibalism is not addressed here in an abstract context, but precisely, as in the Jātaka, in the context of alms and offering of alms. The next stanzas of the same chapter could be a reply to the Buddhist position expressed in the Jātaka verse:

"[Even] when eating this meat in abundance we are not at all stained by evil" (*no ūvalippāmō vayam raeṇam*) — Thus the unbelievers speak; unworthy people; fools; desirous of sensual pleasures. Whosoever eats food of this kind unknowingly does wrong. Virtuous people do not think of doing that. Even mentioning it is wrong. Out of compassion for all living beings the sages, the Jains, avoid blameful faults, are afraid of them and avoid food especially prepared for them (*uddittha-bhatta*). They hate to terrify living beings, laying aside violence against all beings. Therefore they do not eat food of this kind. This is the traditional right practice among recluses of our fold. (2,6,38–41)

This point of contention has remained irreconcilable through the centuries: when later Jain texts express a position on Buddhism, they continue to portray their ascetics as meat-eaters without any dietary restraint and they show some contempt towards them, considering their

⁷²W.B. Bollée's new translation (with minor adjustments) in "Adda or the Oldest Extant Dispute between Jains and Heretics (Sūyagadā 2.6). Part Two", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27 (1999), pp. 411–37 (Part I concerns the Ājīvikas; to be published in Muni Jambuvijaya Felicitation Volume). The older translation by Jacobi (*Jaina Sūtras*, pp. 414ff.), although valid on the whole, is less accurate. These observations also hold for the other extract given below.

laxity as unbefitting for a proper monastic life.⁷³ The fact that different attitudes towards alms were fundamental to the definition of the two groups' religious identities is proved by anecdotes adduced in Prakrit commentaries when defining the notion of *samyaktva* "orthodoxy" for the layman. Respecting orthodoxy means not indulging in the various forms of heretical practices, and such stories often have as protagonists a Jain and a Buddhist (called *bhikkhu* or *rattapada* "red-clothed") in a context connected with food.⁷⁴

The debate just mentioned is connected with the issue of intentionality and its impact on culpability.⁷⁵ The Buddhists consider intention to be a determining factor — absence of *cittasya dusṭatva* explaining why the first and last assertions of the Sūyagadā stanzas (above i and iii) are not blameworthy. As the Jain commentator Śīlāṅka (9th cent.) says, quoting their views: "Whatever act has not been mentally formed does not count."⁷⁶ On the contrary, they commonly interpret the Jain position as putting too little stress on its importance and viewing mental action as "half an action" (*addha-kamma*).⁷⁷ However, this is not accurate. In the earliest Jain tradition the notion of intentionality is not meant "to restrict the applicability of the general prohibition against taking life ... but is made a direct component of the definition of violence".⁷⁸ The distinction between "intended" and allegedly "unintended" violence is invalid, and carelessness (*pramāda*), which

⁷³See Ph. Granoff, "The Violence of Non-Violence: A Study of Some Jain Responses to Non-Jain Religious Practices", *Journal of the International Association for Buddhist Studies*, vol. 15, 1 (1992), pp. 1ff.

⁷⁴See the Āvaśyaka-commentaries connected with the transgressions of orthodoxy or R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga* (London, 1963; reprint Delhi, 1983), p. 46.

⁷⁵On its relationship with the question of food see D.S. Ruegg, "Ahimsā and Vegetarianism in the History of Buddhism", *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* (London, 1980), pp. 234–41.

⁷⁶*Manasākalpitam karma cayam na gacchati asmat-siddhānte*, Sanskrit commentary on Sūyagadā 2.6, 28.

⁷⁷See for instance M I 372 and Abhidharmakośa (Chap. IV), p. 2 and 155 in L. de La Vallée Poussin's translation.

⁷⁸Ph. Granoff, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

leads to the performance of unintended deeds, is strongly reviled as being action itself. Hence the Buddhist position that unintended violence can be excused because it has ignorance as its root is invalid. For the Jains, this cannot be a good reason, since ignorance causes the accumulation of additional karma and bondage. As such it cannot systematically be put forward as an excuse for bad deeds.

Non-violence is defined by right knowledge and proper behaviour, intention being also one factor in this process. However, the possibility of observing complete abstention from all types of violence is not self-evident, and this was a sensitive question which opponents of the Jains did not fail to ask. This is shown, for instance, in the Upālisutta, where the respective importance of bodily activity, verbal activity, and mental activity is discussed using the Jain technical terms: *kāya-dāṇḍa*, *vacī-dāṇḍa*, and *mano-dāṇḍa* (in contrast with the Buddhist term *kamma*).⁷⁹ Although the Jain position emphasizes the gravity of the first, Upāli has to admit that mere walking implies an unavoidable violence and results in killing many small creatures. In order to resolve the dilemma he must contradict his first statement and assume that there is no blame if the creatures are killed unintentionally. In fact, such pragmatic attitudes also developed among the Jains themselves; according to a famous *sūtra*, violence occurs when it arises from passion.⁸⁰ Hence there may be factual violence without bondage of karma, and, conversely, violence without actual killing. What follows is found in a Jain — not a Buddhist — text:

It is the intention that ultimately matters. From the real point of view, a man does not become a killer only because he has killed or because the world is crowded with souls, or remain innocent only because he has not killed physically ... Even if a person does not actually kill, he becomes a killer if he has the intention to kill ... For it is the intention

⁷⁹A famous passage already considered by H. Jacobi, "On Mahāvīra and his predecessors" (1880), pp. 159–60 (= *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 798–99); *Jaina Sūtras*, p. xvii; by I.B. Horner, "Gotama and the other sects", *JAOS* 66 (1946), p. 286.

⁸⁰Cf. Tattvārtha-sūtra 7.8: *pramatta-yogāt prāṇa-vyaparopanām hiṃsā*.

which is the deciding factor, not the external act, which is inconclusive. From the real point of view, it is the evil intention which is violence, whether it materialises into an evil act of injuring or not. There can be non-violence even when an external act of violence has been committed and violence even when it has not been committed.⁸¹

The conception of karma is certainly one of the main issues considered in Pāli scriptures. The Jain position as viewed by the Buddhists is clearly stated in several canonical passages where the "three bases for heresy" (*tīṇi titthāyatanañi*) are discussed. They occur in connection with the theistic view, which explains the individual's experience of pleasure, suffering, or neither-pleasure-nor-suffering as the creation of a supreme deity (*issara-nimmāṇa-hetu*), and with the view that this phenomenon is "without cause, without reason" (*ahetu apaccaya*) as presented in the Ānguttara-nikāya, and (in almost identical terms) in the Vibhaṅga.⁸² The two relevant commentaries use a similar wording, but the Vibhaṅga-āṭhakathā goes a step further by ascribing two out of the three doctrines to precise religious groups. Thus *ahetu apaccaya* is recognized as identifying the Ājīvika doctrine which ascribes everything to Destiny.⁸³ The statement "whatsoever pleasure, pain, or neither-pain-nor-pleasure a man experiences, all this is due to past action" (*pubbe kata-hetu*, Vibh 367.20–22) is recognized by the commentator as expressing the Jain doctrine: *ayam niganṭha-samayo*.⁸⁴ He further expands:

⁸¹Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya 2217–22 as quoted by Dundas (following D.D. Malvania, "Jaina Theory and Practice of Non-Violence", *Sambodhi* 2, 1 (April 1973), reprinted in *Jainism: Some Essays* (Jaipur, 1986), p. 40).

⁸²M II 217.12ff. = A I 173.18ff.; Vibh 367.28–368.3.

⁸³Vibh-a 498.1–3; compare A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas* (London, 1951), pp. 224ff.

⁸⁴Vibh-a 497, 20. This statement was deemed so characteristic of the Jain doctrine that it found its way into the Śrāmaṇyaphalaśūtra incorporated into the Saṅghabheda-vastu of the Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya, edited by R. Gnoli (Rome, 1978), vol. 2, p. 226 §§ 26–28, where it is ascribed to Niganṭha Nātaputta.

But those who assert this deny both active feeling (*kamma-vedanā*) and functional feeling (*kiriya-vedanā*) and accept only resultant feeling (*vipāka-vedanā*). They reject seven out of the eight ailments beginning with that originating from bile (S IV 230) and accept only the eighth (born of kamma-result, *kamma-vipāka*). They reject two out of the three kinds of kamma beginning with that to be experienced here and now (see M III 214f.) and accept only that to be experienced in a subsequent existence. Among the four kinds of volition called profitable, unprofitable, resultant, and functional, they accept only resultant volition.⁸⁵

Here the intellectual approach is interesting. The commentator does not refer to the categories and terminology devised by the Jains themselves to explain their position, but rather uses only well-attested Buddhist categories and notions. This process is undoubtedly effective for a Buddhist audience to whom the terms would be familiar because it offers a rather simplistic and mechanistic picture of the Jain view by insisting upon its narrowness. These features are stressed by the stylistic repetition of the phrases “they reject” and “they accept only” and by the repetition of the word *vipāka*, which ultimately stands out as a key word in the Jain formulation. Exactly as the expression *ahetu apaccaya* is a Pāli label for the Ājīvikas’ tenet, *pubbe kata* with maturation as its necessary complement functions as a label of the Jains’. These statements find expression in the poem ascribed to the Elder Samitigutta in the *Theragāthā*:

Whatever evil was done by me previously in other births, that must now be experienced. No other basic cause exists.⁸⁶

His assertion of this belief is an additional reason to consider as a Jain this Elder, whose name “Protected by the samitis” had already been

⁸⁵Vibh-a 497, 20–27; translation as in *The Dispeller of Delusion*, Part II (Sammoha Vinodani) (Oxford: PTS, 1991), p. 256; compare Ps IV 1.15–18 (on M II 217.12ff.) and Mp II 274.12ff. (on A I 173.18ff.).

⁸⁶Th 81; K.R. Norman’s translation in *Elders’ Verses I*.

correctly interpreted as an indication of his religious affiliation.⁸⁷ In the Jain view the emphasis on karma preconditions the soteriological frame and the importance of ascetic practices as a means to annihilate karma. This leads to a kind of architecture where each piece of the building is connected to the others. At the syntactic level this conception is conveyed by a series of statements mutually linked through the stylistic figure *kāraṇamālā*, quite common in Jain phraseology, even if not confined to it:

Thus by burning up, by making an end of ancient deeds, by the non-doing of new deeds, there is no overflowing into the future. From there being no overflowing into the future comes the destruction of deeds; from the destruction of deeds comes the destruction of anguish; from the destruction of anguish comes the destruction of feeling; from the destruction of feeling all anguish will become worn away.⁸⁸

Complementary to the karma-theory is the question of the nature of the soul, for, as is vigorously said by a Prakrit stanza handed down in the commentary on the Laghukālacakratantra: “Sometimes the soul is stronger, sometimes karmas are stronger. This is how the soul and karmas have developed a long-standing hostility.”⁸⁹ In the sub-

⁸⁷Given these facts, it becomes clear that the dogma *pubbe kata-hetu* of the Mahābodhijātaka (No. 528), Ja V 238.29*ff. should be connected with Nigantha Nātaputta (V 246.12’). even if the verse itself does not establish the connection.

⁸⁸E.g. *iti purānānam kammānam tapasā vyantibhāvā, navānam kammānam akaraṇā, āyatim anavassavo, āyatim anavassavā kamma-kkhayo, kamma-kkhayā dukkha-kkhayo, dukkha-kkhayā vedanā-kkhayo, vedanā-kkhayā sabbam dukkham nijinñam bhavissati*, M II 217.14–18 (translation from *Middle Length Sayings*); Sanskrit in Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya, edited by R. Gnoli (Rome, 1978), p. 226 § 27.

⁸⁹Katthai jīvo (Ed. hoi, to be omitted) *balio katthai kammāi honti baliāi | jīvassa a kammassa a pubba-nibaddhāi verāi*, p. 269. The ultimate source of this stanza is not known, but its occurrence in a modern anthology of maxims such as the *Prākṛta-sūkta-ratnamālā* (Banaras, 1919: No. 123) proves its popularity.

commentary of the Dīgha-nikāya the Jain position is summarized as follows:

The Jains say that the immaterial self has the same extent as the body in which it is located, like the bitter taste in a lemon leaf.⁹⁰

The two features of the analysis developed by the Jains in their own scriptures are here aptly underlined: the immaterial character of the *jīva* and its ability to contract or expand so that it pervades the body it occupies, whether big or small.⁹¹ The expression *sarīra-parimāṇa* corresponds to the *sva-deha-parimāṇa* of the Jain texts and indicates the co-extensiveness of the soul with the body.⁹² At the same time, we notice a terminological difference both here and in other passages. Pāli scriptures regularly use *attā*, where Jain scriptures would favour *jīva*, which emphasizes the living sentient nature of the soul in contradistinction to non-life.⁹³

Pāli exegetical literature of the sub-commentaries may seem less fascinating because it takes us further away from the early period and the so-called “original” message of the Buddha, but it has much to offer. From the still largely unexplored world of *tīkās* valuable information about the Jains can be gleaned. A reference to Jain practices designated by proper technical terms in the Visuddhimagga-mahātīkā has been mentioned above. Furthermore, in this undoubtedly rich and learned

⁹⁰Nimba-paññe tittaka-raso viya sarīra-parimāṇo arūpī attā tattha tiṭṭhatī ti Niganṭhā, Sv-pṭ I 223,18–20.

⁹¹Hence, *sarīra-parimāṇo* (*attā*) of Ud-a 339,³¹ is to be identified as a reference to the Jain position, in the same way as *anguṭha-parimāṇo*, *yava-parimāṇo*, *paramāṇu-p.* *attā* have been recognized as referring to Upaniṣadic, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika ideas by the translator (Oxford: PTS, 1995), n. 305–306, p. 926. The Jain conception is also highlighted in non-Pāli Buddhist sources: see, for example, Prajñāvarman’s Tibetan commentary on the Viśeṣastava, v. 45; Laghukālacakratantra v. 176 (*jīvah kāya-pramāṇo*).

⁹²See e.g. P.S. Jaini, introduction to Amṛtacandrasūri’s *Laghutattvasphoṭa* (Ahmedabad: L.D. Series 62, 1978), p. 13.

⁹³See below, p. 36.

work, whose author is well acquainted with the main schools of Indian thought, the discussion of views on final release serves as a basis for a casual allusion to Jain cosmological ideas: “Final release — salvation — occurs on the summit of the world, for example according to the Jains”.⁹⁴ This is an unambiguous reference to the Jain conception of *siddhi* as being figuratively located on the top of the three worlds. I have noted above that the interpretation of the *cātuyāma-saṃvara* offered by the sub-commentary on the Dīgha-nikāya reflects a distinct stage of Jain doctrinal development. I would now like to give two more important instances from the Visuddhimagga-mahātīkā and from the Sumangalavilāsinī-tīkā — both written by Dhammapāla (A.D. 550–600) — which reveal a sound knowledge of classical Jain concepts which is apparently unattested in the earlier strata of Pāli literature.

For any Jain, the *tattvas*, “reals” or “fundamental entities” as we can call them, form an object of faith and as such are the basis of their philosophy. The *tattvas* have their own history, and it is possible that the full-fledged list does not date from the earliest times, even if it appears at least once in a canonical text and is the subject of the Tattvārthasūtra. A rather thorough account of these *tattvas* appears in the Visuddhimagga-mahātīkā.⁹⁵ The passage is typical of the pseudodoxography we find in Pāli literature and appears in chapter 16 of the work called *Dīṭṭhivisuddhiniddesa*.

One by one non-Buddhist conceptions are rather faithfully delineated with the terms used in their own sources, but in the end they

⁹⁴Niganṭhānam viya ca loka-thūpikāyam apavaggo mokkho ti, Vism-mhṭ 1157.4–5 (= 2.218 of the Burmese edition available on CSCD). For mere practical reasons I here refer to the Nalanda edition, which is the only one available to me in book form at present.

⁹⁵Vism-mhṭ 1384.4–87.5 (= CSCD 2, pp. 360–61). Prof. von Hinüber drew this passage to my attention when he visited Paris in winter 1996. — For another exposé of the nine Jain categories in a non-Pāli Buddhist source see the Tarkajvālā on Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā, II-B-3-c, in Sh. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 228–30.

are stated to be invalid. The twofold division into physical and mental of all the states of the three planes gives the starting point for an assessment of what the “outside doctrines (*bāhiraka*) have thought of as being categories”.⁹⁶ These categories are shown to be useless and wrong because they are ultimately included in one way or the other within *nāma* and *rūpa*. Since the issue concerns “categories” (*padattha*), each of the heterodoxies discussed is identified with a key phrase which is meant by the Buddhist author to summarize the view in question. Thus *pakati-ādi* means Sāṃkhya, *dravyādi* means Vaiśeṣika, *jīvādi* means Jainism, and *kāyādi* means the doctrine of the Ājīvikas, each of them being then discussed in turn.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ *Yam ito bāhirakehi padattha-bhāvena parikappitam*, Vism-mhṭ 1384.4.

⁹⁷ (1) Sāṃkhya (Pāli *Kāpila*, plur.): the classical expanded list of twenty-five categories with a discussion: matter or basis (*pakati* or *padhāna*), great principle or intellect (*mahā* or *buddhi*), sense of ego (*ahankāro* or *asmimattā*), subtle elements (*tammattāni*), senses divided into senses of intelligence (*buddh'indriyāni*), senses of action (*kamma°*) and mind (*mano*), elements (*bhūtāni*), eternal consciousness (*puriso*) — (2) Vaiśeṣika (no proper name mentioned): list of six categories: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmañña*), particularity (*visesa*), inherence (*samavāya*). As expected at the period when the text was written (5th–6th cent. A.D.), inexistence (*abhāva*) is not yet included. It came to be officially included much later, from the 12th century onwards (see W. Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is* (Delhi, 1993), pp. 69ff.). — (3) Jaina (see below). — (4) Ājīvika (no proper name mentioned): the list of the seven elemental categories (cf. Basham, pp. 16 and 262) which form *kāya*, i.e. earth (*pathavī*), water (*āpa*), fire (*teja*), air (*vāyu*), life (*attā*), joy (*sukha*), and sorrow (*dukkha*); and the list of the six colours (here called *jāti*; cf. Basham, p. 243; more usual is *abhijāti*): black (*kaṇha*), blue (*nīla*), red (*ratta*), yellow (*pīta*; more frequent “green”, *halidda*), white (*sukka*), and extremely white (*atisukka*) easily identify this group as such. But in the list of births (*gatiyo*), i.e. god (*sura*), human (*manuja*), ghost (*peta*), animal (*tiracchāna*), and hell (*naraka*), the categories *pavatti* and *apavagga* would deserve more investigation as they are not as clearly supported by other sources as the others. — For another passage in the Vism-mhṭ dealing with the ideas about salvation of the theists, Ājīvikas, followers of Sāṃkhya and Jains, see pp. 1156–57 (= CSCD Burmese ed. 2.218); pp. 1162–63 again about Sāṃkhya.

Jīvādi, the key phrase for the Jains, is expanded with a list enumerating the following nine terms: the sentient (*jīva*), the insentient (*ajīva*), bondage (*bandha*), good karmas (*puṇya*), bad karmas (*pāpa*), karmic influx (*āśava*), stoppage of karmic influx (*saṃvara*), destruction of karmas (*nijjara*) and liberation (*vimokkha*). It is easy to recognize here the nine-termed classical list of *tattvas*, all referred to by their usual technical designations. Since the concepts are mutually dependent from the logical point of view, the sequence of the terms is generally fixed, at least for the first components (*jīva-ajīva*) and the last components (*saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣa*).⁹⁸ The Pāli list conforms to this principle as well. In the middle part, however, there is a degree of uncertainty regarding the place of the pair *puṇya-pāpa*, which has a special status, as the existence of a variant list with seven *tattvas* — implying them in *āśava* or *bandha* — shows.

A remarkable feature of the Pāli list is the unusual location of bondage before influx, a sequence which is not very consistent with the way the karmic process functions.⁹⁹ But nothing more can be deduced from this observation. The list is followed by the more or less exhaustive explanation of each concept. The treatment of *jīva*, for instance, is tantalizingly brief and literal: “*jīva* means *attā*”; this synonymy is of some significance since the Jains do not favour the use of *ātman* in such a context. No reference is made here to the cognitive capacity and intrinsic purity of the *jīva*, although from the Jain perspective these are prominent features which account for the specificity of the Jain understanding of omniscience. Similarly, the Pāli commentator feels *puṇya* and *pāpa* to be self-evident. All the other *tattvas* (except one) are defined by means of a phrase which could be a quotation (*vacanato*).

⁹⁸ The juxtaposition of *saṃvara* and *nirjarā* which make a pair (the only Pāli instance of which is precisely our Vism-mhṭ passage according to the CSCD) may have also been encouraged by stylistic factors (homotelenon). However, variations in the sequence are not unknown: cf. Ṭhāṇāṅga 9 (*nava-sabbhāvapay'attā pannattā*), Haribhadra, Saddarśanasamuccaya 4.47, etc.

⁹⁹ Cf. Tattvārtha-sūtra 1.4: *jīvājīvāśrava-bandha-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam*, the *locus classicus* on the topic.

Only one of them is really easy to identify: *āsava-nirodho samvāro* “stopping the influx of karmic particles, that is *samvara*” is the Pāli equivalent of Tattvārthasūtra 9.1 (*āsrava-nirodhah samvarah*), one of the best known sūtras of this famous treatise. Tracing the sources of the remaining quotations would be helpful for a clearer chronological and geographical assessment of the Pāli *tiikā*. But even if their statements do not exactly correspond to what we read in the Tattvārthasūtra or similar works, they are close enough to these texts to show that the information of the Pāli commentator is sound:

Bondage (*bandha*) is defined as the intimate union of the soul with karmic matter.¹⁰⁰

Expulsion of karmic particles (*nijara*) is said to be the non-occurrence of the natural condition which creates a karmic result¹⁰¹ and thus is meant to stop karmic maturation.

Salvation (*mokkha*) is “the fact of being free from all karmic matters”,¹⁰² an equivalent to Tattvārthasūtra 10.3 *kṛtsna-karma-kṣayo mokṣah*.

The definition of *ajīva* is the only one for which no quotation is adduced. All the same, the Mahātīkā’s statement is quite in line with the Jain conception:

Th[is] notion applies to matter (*puggala*), motion (*dhamma*), rest (*adhamma*), space (*ākāsa*) and time (*kāla*).¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ *Bandho kamma-puggal’antara-samyogo ti vacanato*, III 1386.10; compare Tattvārthasūtra 8.2: *jīvah karmaṇo yogyān pudgalān ādatte*.

¹⁰¹ *Kammaphala-ppavatti�ā pakati�ā appavatti nijaro ti vacanato*, III 1386.13-

14. The Pāli wording is not very straightforward. No similar phrasing could be traced in Jain sources. In Buddhist literature *nijara* is commonly used as a masculine, whereas the idioms used by the Jains normally use it as a feminine in its technical meaning. The gender-distinction *cum* meaning-distinction is discussed in P. Skilling, *Mahāsūtras II* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 414–18.

¹⁰² *Mokkho pi savva-kamma-vimokkho ti vacanato*, III 1386.14.

¹⁰³ *Puggala-dhammādhammākāśa-kālesu ajīva-saññā*, III 1386.7; compare Tattvārthasūtra 5.1 *ajīva-kāyā dharmādharma-kāśa-pudgalāḥ*, and 5.39 *kālaś ca*; Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya v. 124.

The inclusion of time and its recognition as an independent substance are not taken as self-evident in the Jain tradition, and the status of this concept has been the topic of numerous discussions. Works of Digambara affiliation normally recognize it as belonging to the category of *ajīva*; this fact could be a clue about the kind of source used by the Pāli commentator. The interpretation of the unique technical meanings of *dharma* and *adharma* as principles to ensure the motion (*gati*) and the steadiness (*sthiti*) of living beings and matter, to help these functions only, and not as terms of ethics, is fully correct.¹⁰⁴ The list of the characteristics of matter agrees broadly with the Jain counterparts. Compare *Visuddhimagga-mahātīkā*:

sadda-phassa-rūpa-rasa-gandha-saṃṭhāna-bandha-bheda-sukhuma-parāparāghāta-ppabhā-cchāyōjjāka-tamāni puggala-lakkhaṇam ti puggalo (III 1386.7–8)

and Tattvārthasūtra 5.23:

sparśa-rasa-gandha-varṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ; (24) śabda-bandha-saukṣmya-sthāulya-saṃsthāna-bheda-tamaś chāyātāpoddoyavantaḥ.

The words for sound, palpability, form (Pāli *rūpa*/TS *varṇa*), taste, smell, shape, binding, splitting, subtle(ness), shadow and darkness are the usual ones in such a context. Grossness (TS *sthāulya*) has no corresponding Pāli term but may be implicit in *sukhuma*; the distinction between heat (or hot light) and cool light, which is conveyed in the Tattvārthasūtra by the contrasting pair *ātapa* and *uddiyota*, has a vague parallel in *ppabhā* and *ujjota* (corr. for eds. *ujjāka*). If the unsatisfactory *para-aparāghāta* may be understood as “composed with another [and] not composed with another” (?), it could be a reminiscence of the distinction between atoms (*anu*) and conglomerates (*saṃghāta*), which is expected in this environment and at this point of the argumentation,

¹⁰⁴ *Dhammādhammā jīva-puggalānam gati-ṭhiti-mattatāya tad-avisitthā*, Vism-mh 1386.9; compare Tattvārthasūtra 5.17: *gati-sthity-upagrahau dharmādharma-yor upakārah*; etc.

even if these terms are generally not a part of the above mentioned list in Jain texts.¹⁰⁵

Finally, the way *vimokkha* is treated is clearly evocative of the method normally applied in Jain exegesis to the analysis of key terms. This method takes the help of various well-determined parameters and finds its full development in the so-called *nikṣepa*. In its simplest form, the parameters are two, namely *dravya* and *bhāva*. The *dravya* aspect refers to the concrete or literal meaning of a term, while the *bhāva* aspect refers to its meaning in a spiritual or religious context. Here, the text says, *dravya-mokkha* implies that a soul is only immateriality, whereas *bhāva-mokkha* is the absence of any modification in the soul caused by the states of passion, etc.¹⁰⁶ Although with a possible confusion in the contents of the terms, this is roughly reminiscent of a distinction known from some Jain sources, apparently only Digambara. According to them *bhāva-mokṣa* refers to the process of modification through which the soul is able to annihilate the four karmas that have a vitiating effect upon its qualities (the *ghātiya-karmas*), whereas *dravya-mokṣa* refers to liberation from the four determining karmas the function of which is only to generate embodiment and individual particulars.¹⁰⁷

The sub-commentaries seem rather well acquainted with Jain scholasticism and methods of argumentation, especially with the one known as “sevenfold predication” which is so typical. While the technical term *satta-bhaṅga* does not seem to occur in the Pāli canon itself, it appears, for instance, in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī-ṭīkā*, where *sattabhaṅga-vāda* stands as an indirect designation for Jain philosophy. The

¹⁰⁵ See *Tattvārthaśūtra* 5.25: *aṇavaḥ skandhāś ca*, (26) *saṃghāta-bhedebhya utpadyante*.

¹⁰⁶ *Jīvo ca arūpa-mattam evā ti ayam dravya-mokkho; bhāva-mokkho pana jīvassa rāgādi-bhāvāparināmo*, Vism-mhṭ 1386.16–17.

¹⁰⁷ See the references collected in the Jainendra-Siddhānta-Kośa (Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānapīṭha, 1987) vol. 3, pp. 322–23 (Kundakunda, Pañcāstikāya vv. 150–53; Nemicandra, Dravyasamgraha, v. 37). For the list of the eight karmas see above n. 32.

commentator’s purpose is to demonstrate “the untenability of the doctrine of the seven predicates, which claims that entities possessing origin, decay, and persistence may be permanent, may be impermanent, and may be inexpressible”.¹⁰⁸ The terms used for defining the triple character of the existent are exactly those of the Jain treatises: *utpādayaya-dhrauvya-yuktam sat*, to quote just one famous sūtra from the *Tattvārtha* (5.29). On the other hand, the commentator restricts his list to the three primary predicates of the sevenfold set, which are sufficient for his argumentation:

- (1) in a way everything is;
- (2) in a way everything is not;
- (3) in a way it is unutterable.

The four missing ones are easily obtained by combining those three in different manners:

- (4) in a way it is and in a way it is not;
- (5) in a way it is, in a way it is unutterable;
- (6) in a way it is not, in a way it is unutterable;
- (7) in a way it is, in a way it is not, in a way it is unutterable.

The Pāli wording is quite accurate and in full agreement with the Jain counterpart. One immediately notices the basic word *siyā*, a starting point for the generic term *syādvāda*, which became the standard designation for this process. In the course of the systematic refutation which is then undertaken, one also comes across the typical term *anekaṇṭavāda*, “the theory of the manifoldness of reality” which considers that each entity consists of diverse forms and modes, of innumerable aspects, and that destruction (i.e. losing the previous form), appearance (i.e. assuming a new modification), and continuity (i.e. persistence of the essential nature) coexist:

¹⁰⁸ *Uppāda-vaya-dhuvatā-yutta-bhāvā siyā niccā, siyā aniccā, siyā na vattabbā ti ādinā pavattassa satta-bhaṅga-vādassa ayuttatā vibhāvitā hoti*, Sv-pṭ I 198.20–23.

But those who say: "Just as when a crown is made out of a golden pot, the existence of a pot disappears and the existence of a crown arises, whereas the existence of gold remains the same, exactly in the same way, in the case of all properties, one property disappears, another one arises, but the specific property remains" [to them it should be said ...].¹⁰⁹

This example adduced to illustrate the Jain view and ascribed to its tradition can be recognized as reminiscent of the idea expressed by the Jain Digambara philosopher Samantabhadra (c. A.D. 550) in his *Āptamīmāṃsā* (3.59):

ghaṭa-mauli-suvarṇārthī nāśōtpāda-sthitīṣ ayam
śoka-pramoda-mādhyasthyāṇ jano yāti sa-hetukam.

When the pot is destroyed, the crown is created and the gold stays on, the [same] person desiring [them], experiences pain, joy and neutrality — justified."¹¹⁰

But the refutation underlines that the Jain way of arguing starts on a wrong basis and is self-contradictory:

What is the gold which remains the same in both the pot and the ornament? If it is said to be materiality, then it is impermanent like sound. If it is said to be an aggregation of materiality, an aggregation

¹⁰⁹ Ye pana vadanti 'yathā suvanna-ghaṭena makuṭe kate ghaṭa-bhāvo nassati, makuṭa-bhāvo uppajjati, suvanna-bhāvo titthati yeva, evaṁ sabba-bhāvānaṁ koci dhammo nassati, koci dhammo uppajjati, sa-bhāvo pana titthati' ti (te vattabbā), Sv-pṭ I 198.29–99.3.

¹¹⁰ My translation. Compare N.J. Shah, *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā, Critique of an Authority* (along with English translation, introduction, notes, and Akalanka's Sanskrit Commentary *Aṣṭaśatī*) (Ahmedabad, 1999), p. 55. See also B.K. Matilal, *The Central Philosophy of Jainism* (Anekāntavāda) (Ahmedabad: L.D. Series 79, 1981), p. 39, along with Kumārila's explanation in the *Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārtika*. Among other similar examples adduced in this connection by the Jains are the one of the milk and the curd (*Āptamīmāṃsā* III.60; for the Buddhist interpretation of the same example see, for instance, D I 201.26ff.) or the one of the seed, the sprout, and the tree (*Tattvapradīpikā* on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra* 2.9), the pot and the clay (cty on *Tattvārthaśūtra* 5.29).

is a mere conventional term to which neither existence, nor non-existence, nor permanence apply. Thus no doctrine of *anekānta* can obtain here. ... Moreover, the self and the world are not of an "eternal, non-eternal, indicible" nature ... like lamps and so on. For it is impossible to recognize a permanent, impermanent, indicible own-nature in form, etc., the nature of which is to rise and fall. Similarly [it is impossible to recognize] one form or the other among "permanent", etc. in the living principle.¹¹¹

In so stating, the Pāli commentator reflects the first among the traditional objections opposed to *syād-vāda*, i.e. self-contradiction, which he underlines again when he rejects the Jain assertion "There is soul, in a way it is permanent, in a way it is not".¹¹² For the Jains, however, *syāt* and *anekānta* do not mean uncertain or confusing answers but *conditional* assertions meant to embrace the complex nexus of reality.¹¹³

To conclude: The Buddhists of the Pāli sources are not very different from other external observers, ancient or modern, who have looked at Jain ways of life and conceptions, both in the topics which have caught their attention and in their approach. As far as practice is concerned, they are mainly the question of nudity, extreme asceticism, strict rules for begging, and eating. As far as doctrine goes, they are the Jain categories and the Jain way of looking at living beings with the crucial point of one-sensed living beings. In several cases it is not easy to

¹¹¹ Sv-pṭ I 199.3ff. Translation (with minor adjustments) from *The Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views*, translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Bodhi (Kandy, 1978), p. 156.

¹¹² *Atthi jīvo, so ca siyā nicco, siyā anicco*, Sv-pṭ I 298.26.

¹¹³ See the clear, accurate statements of B.K. Matilal, *op. cit.*, a very convenient book which has the advantage of considering the Jain philosophical system together with the objections it has produced from other schools: "The *Anekānta* doctrine, to be sure, is neither a doctrine of doubt (or even uncertainty) nor a doctrine of probability. Thus *syāt* means, in the Jaina use, a conditional YES. It is like saying, 'in a certain sense, yes'. It amounts to conditional approval" (p. 52).

distinguish Jains from Ājīvikas, who are shown as sharing ideas or customs. As sharp critics, the Buddhists have emphasized sensitive issues which were fundamental to their opponents, such as the extreme consequences of the theory of non-violence combined with the question of intentionality. They are prompt to denounce the casuistry of the Jain tenets or arguments. As can be seen from stray references given above to non-Pāli Buddhist sources, these points are also those highlighted in the Buddhist perception of Jainism as expressed in Sanskrit or Tibetan texts.

Although the basically polemical attitude of Theravādins has naturally restricted the power of their analyses, confrontation with available Jain texts shows that sound and reliable evidence is clothed in literary garb, that there is a full awareness of Jain technical terminology. The second layer of Pāli exegesis, especially the sub-commentaries written by Dhammapāla, contains valuable material. It seems to reflect a historical context where “Jains” seems to mean rather “Digambaras” than “Śvetāmbaras”. As far as Dhammapāla is concerned, this could be explained by his South Indian milieu, where Digambaras were more numerous than their rivals. But in non-Pāli Buddhist sources — as well as in non-Buddhist sources — there are hints which suggest that Digambaras were also the main, if not the only, target, as if the Śvetāmbara tradition were negligible. This fact has still to be explained.

Nalini Balbir

The Legend of the Establishment of the Buddhist Order of Nuns in the Theravāda Vinaya-Pitaka

Even the Buddhist world has not remained unaffected by the growing awareness of the position of women, and Western Buddhist groups in particular have found it necessary to discuss the attitude of Buddhism to the position of women in society. Clarification of the attitude of early Buddhists towards women, and especially of the position accorded to nuns in the early Buddhist community, may well be expected from a detailed examination of the Vinaya-piṭaka. This book of the discipline of the Order rules on many questions regarding the daily life of monks and nuns of the time and also contains much information relating to cultural history. Passages which include references to or indeed exclusively refer to nuns shed light on the attitude towards women in early Buddhism.

Apart from the Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga, which contains those rules of the Pātimokkha that only apply to nuns as well as their histories and the relevant commentaries, there are few passages in the Vinaya-piṭaka which specifically relate to women. However, an examination of those passages in the Khandhaka reveals much which renders a consistent evaluation of the position of women in early Buddhism more difficult. In this paper the first section of the tenth chapter of the Cullavagga (Cv X.1 = Vin II 253–56) will be examined for direct and indirect statements regarding the position of women. In this section the events

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